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WITH PER CAPITA INCOME SWELLING better than Þvefold from 1970to 1995, Korea was on the leading edge of the East Asian miracle.But 1997Õs Þnancial crises brought the miracle to an abrupt end,
raising questions about KoreaÕs economic prospects and the underlying
reality of the East Asian boom.
To help answer these questions, we studied KoreaÕs current economic
performance and used this knowledge to gauge what its medium- and 
long-term growth potential might be.* We examined how the regulatory
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environment has a˜fected Korean companies in four manufacturing industries
(automobiles, steel, food processing, and semiconductors) and four service
industries (retail banking, general merchandise retailing, housing con-
struction, and telecommunications). Our main conclusions are:
¥ Overall, the old regulatory environment led to high inputs (especially in
manufacturing), and low productivity (Exhibits 1 and 2).
POWERSTOCK/ZEPHYR
¥ Despite massive investment in the
best available manufacturing tech-
nology, protectionism and poor cor-
porate governance prevented Korean
companies from adopting the best
management practices. As a result,
labor and capital productivity in
most manufacturing sectors stands at
less than half of US levels.
¥ Service sector industries were sys-
tematically starved of capital. As 
a result, companies are well below 
scale and highly ine˜Þcient. Their
performance is further hindered by
regulations — stringent zoning laws in
retailing and product and pricing
restrictions in retail banking — that
dampened competition. 
¥ Thorough reform of the economy
is the only way to restore high growth
and employment. This reform must
include removing o˜ten-overlooked
service sector regulations. Our work shows that KoreaÕs old regulatory
environment has reached its limit. Even with sustained high investment, 
the potential for annual GDP per capita growth under the current regula-
tory regime could not exceed 3 percent per year for ten years following
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Exhibit 1
GDP per capita
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Exhibit 2
Labor productivity and employment by sector, 1995
Index: United States 1995 = 100
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stabilization, and even then the economy would still remain vulnerable to
further Þnancial crises. By contrast, GDP per capita growth was 6.7 percent
per year between 1970 and 1996.
If growth in GDP per capita is to return to these levels, across-the-board
economic reform is essential. Our previous studies have shown that the
service sector is the engine of job growth in all major economies. Without
reform, KoreaÕs service sector will not create jobs for the workers displaced as
manufacturing productivity rises. Reform plans that neglect the service sector
and deal only with corporate governance and increasing foreign competition
in the Þnancial and manufacturing sectors are thus especially dangerous in
the short term because they will increase unemployment. 
Rapid growth
KoreaÕs impressive growth over the past 25 years can be explained largely
by the fact that its people worked long hours and saved a great deal, which led
to the rapid accumulation of capital. Coupled with strong exports, this meant
that Korea was able to climb the technology ladder quickly. It began by
exporting clothing, which provided the foreign currency to import machinery
to build cars. More recently, it has been exporting cars and importing
machinery to make semiconductors. 
Most of KoreaÕs investment has been directed into manufacturing, giving
the country almost as much manufacturing capital stock per capita as the
United States. Yet capital prod-
uctivity in many manufactur-
ing sectors is only half of US
levels (Exhibit 3). This can be
explained by the fact that
although Korea has invested
in best practice technology, it
has failed to adopt best prac-
tice management techniques.
In semiconductor manufac-
turing, for example, Korean
companies use machines
similar to those employed by
US companies, but produce low-value DRAM chips instead of more complex
microprocessors. Within the DRAM industry, Micron, the largest US
manufacturer, boasts capital productivity 50 percent higher than that of the
average Korean maker. Similarly, KoreaÕs failure to implement lean
manufacturing in the automotive industry means its car makers produce only
half as many vehicles as their Japanese counterparts in a similar plant. 
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Exhibit 3
Capital allocation and capital productivity, 1995
Index: United States 1995 = 100
*	Excludes utilities
 	Excludes construction and agriculture
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By contrast, the service sector has been starved of capital, leading to subscale
and ine˜Þcient operations. Korea has almost no modern retailing formats,
for example; family-run stores account for 70 percent of retail employment,
compared with less than 20 percent in the United States.
Then the slowdown
If existing regulations remained, they would slow KoreaÕs recovery from its
present crisis and possibly expose it to future di˜Þculties. They would also
depress growth in GDP per capita, for three reasons:
¥ Growth can no longer be fueled by increases in the proportion of the
population that is of working age, and by the migration of workers away from
agriculture. These two e˜fects accounted for two percentage points of the 
7 percent annual GDP per capita growth of the past ten years.
¥ Growth through new investment in manufacturing would decline. The
failure to raise capital productivity and the negligible scope for technological
improvement are leading to rapidly falling marginal returns on manufacturing
investment (Exhibit 4). Capital productivity must be improved by the
adoption of best management practices or Korea will remain vulnerable to
Þnancial crises that could jeopardize its growth. 
But capital productivity will not improve much if Korea continues to Þnance
uneconomic investments and resist the pressures of imports and foreign direct
investment. In the past, it was relatively easy for Korean companies to gain an
advantage in ÒsimpleÓ sectors such as clothing, because labor costs were low.
Even in the more complicated integrated steel industry, government-imposed
price pressures and Japanese assistance helped companies achieve best
practice. But in the far more complex automobile and semiconductor
industries, Korea is struggling to learn and catch up with ever-advancing
competitors. Among car makers, for example, productivity growth is lower
than it was in Japan at the same stage of development.
¥ Growth in services will remain slow as long as regulations restrict
investment and productivity gains. Substantial barriers to growth exist in
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Exhibit 4
Capital productivity and return on capital investments, 1995
Index: United States 1995 = 100
*	Capital inputs per labor hour
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each of the four service sectors we studied. In retailing, strict zoning laws
and bureaucracy are blocking the development of larger, more productive
stores in the suburbs. In housing construction, zoning laws and price ceilings
favor standardized apartments. This prevents single-family homes and
customized condominiums — the most e˜Þcient way to provide housing on a
large scale, and the model for 70 percent of new housing in the United States
and 60 percent in the land-starved Netherlands — from being built.
Similarly, in retail banking, restrictions on products and pricing limit
competition between banks and lead to overpriced, mediocre products and
underused, oversta˜fed branches. In telecommunications, pricing regulations
limit growth in call volume and new services. If telecom companies were
allowed to price local calls at near-zero marginal cost, network use would
increase and service quality improve in many other industries.
Steps in the right direction
Reform plans currently under discussion cover the supervision and
governance of the Þnancial sector and the lowering of barriers to imports
and foreign direct investment. Liberalization in these areas could reduce the
risk of further Þnancial setbacks, since companies would be forced by a
combination of increased competition, better bank lending, and more
demanding shareholders to adopt better management practices and improve
returns on investment. 
In addition, higher manufacturing productivity growth should enable per
capita GDP to grow by 4 percent a year on average, more than could be
achieved without reform. In e˜fect, higher manufacturing productivity and
lower import barriers would bring down prices and higher capital produc-
tivity would reduce the need for imported machinery, enabling domestic
consumption to increase without raising the trade deÞcit or external debt. 
Importance of service reform 
However, these reforms are insu˜Þcient. The experience of developed econ-
omies shows that the performance of service industries becomes increasingly
important for output and employment growth as incomes rise. Deregulating
its service sector would enable Korea not only to employ the labor sloughed
by more e˜Þcient manufacturers, but also to boost manufacturing output.
Per capita GDP growth could return to 6 percent a year.
Relaxing zoning laws for retailers, for example, would allow the construction
of large modern retail formats that provide new jobs and better service. While
building high-productivity shopping malls would consume some additional
land, the loss of green space would be small. If Korea raised its labor prod-
uctivity in retailing to 69 percent of the US level, only an additional 4 percent
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of existing commercial land or 0.1 of undeveloped but usable land would 
be needed. Moreover, building malls would generate jobs in construction. In
banking, the removal of restrictions on investment products would lead to
the creation of jobs in the design, marketing, and selling of products.
The rapid development of new services would bring beneÞts for manu-
facturing too. Modern independent retailers would force manufacturers to
reduce prices and increase productivity. They would also stimulate demand
with better marketing. Greater competitive pressure in retailing and retail
banking would in turn force more companies to invest in information
technology (service companies are the biggest users of IT), creating jobs
among IT providers. The people who Þll these jobs would then be likely to
consume more manufactured goods.
If all these measures were introduced, we estimate that with investment
equivalent to 30 percent of GDP (realistic by Korean standards), the econ-
omy could grow by 6 percent a year, taking it to 90 percent of the United
StatesÕ current per capita GDP by 2010. Productivity-led growth of this kind
would be faster and more sustainable than the current Japanese-style input-
driven variety.
Social problems
Only total reform will reduce KoreaÕs susceptibility to future Þnancial and
social difÞculties. Anything less would mean lower growth and could create
serious employment problems.
Policy changes directed at
manufacturers alone, such as
the li˜ting of import barriers
and the reform of the Þnan-
cial sector, would cause em-
ployment to fall in these
areas because productivity
would rise faster than output
(Exhibit 5). This is a trend
that has been observed in all
developed economies. Unfor-
tunately, job creation in
service industries would be
limited because present regu-
lations inhibit the growth of
new high-value services. Laid-
o˜f manufacturing workers
and young people reaching
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Exhibit 5
Policy reforms and future wage distribution
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working age would be forced into low-value service jobs or, if the minimum
wage were raised, unemployment. 
Assuming that Korea imposed minimum wage and unemployment beneÞts at
US levels, we estimate that a reform program that neglected the service sector
could lead to unemployment of 12 percent. Reform that included the service
sector, on the other hand, would lead to rapid growth in good service jobs
and reduce the expected level of unemployment to 5 percent, even if the US
minimum wage were set.
Implications 
While a comprehensive reform program will take time and resources, there is
no economic or social reason to delay. Korea should not fear the period of
adjustment. On the contrary, a completely reformed economy would attract
foreign investment and create jobs immediately, when they are most needed.
Important value-creation opportunities were present in almost all the
industries we studied. In manufacturing, openings lie in making better use of
existing machinery. In underdeveloped service industries, developing new
markets is the key. Korean companies seeking to beneÞt from these
opportunities must act quickly to reform their corporate governance, refocus
their portfolios, and seek out partnerships with leading multinational
companies in order to learn best management practices. 
KoreaÕs current crisis represents a unique opportunity for its government. It
is a chance to embark on far-reaching changes that would enable the economy
to return to rapid but balanced growth based on higher productivity in
manufacturing and increased investment in services. Miss the chance, and
the country could, like Latin America in the 1980s and Japan in the 1990s,
lapse into a prolonged period of stagnation.
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